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China	 China	 100	 70	
USA	 USA	 100	 50	
European	Union	 EU	 75	 90	
Brazil	 Brazil	 70	 70	
India	 India	 60	 80	
Japan	 Japan	 60	 50	
Russia	 Russia	 60	 10	
Alliance	of	Small	Island	States	 AOSIS	 50	 100	
Least	Developed	Countries	 LDCs	 50	 95	



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































EEA	 21	 EEA	of	aggregate	ambition	 Yes	








































































































EEA	 24	 EEA	of	aggregate	ambition	 Yes	







































Ambition	 	 	 	
2050	 64	if	
convergence	
achieved	
Somewhat	less	than	goal	of	70%	
GHG	reduction	relative	to	2010	
No.	Little	movement	
from	initial	positions	
2100	 91	if	
convergence	
achieved	
Goal	of	zero	net	emissions	with	
some	reference	to	repairing	
damage	
No.	Little	movement	
from	initial	positions	
Progression	 56	if	
convergence	
achieved	
Clear	commitment	to	progression	
principle	
No,	India	remains	
reluctant	while	LDCs	
and	African	group	
continue	to	call	for	
stronger	commitment		
	
5.	Concluding	Remarks	
	
The	analyses	presented	here	give	reason	for	cautious	optimism	regarding	the	
outcome	of	Paris	2015.	On	ten	of	the	thirteen	main	controversial	issues	we	forecast	
the	emergence	of	broad	consensus	among	the	main	stakeholders,	and	the	expected	
compromises	represent	substantial	progress	in	the	global	governance	of	climate	
change.	These	forecasts	assume,	however,	that	all	of	the	issues	are	kept	on	the	
agenda	at	the	same	time	during	the	conference.	If	the	negotiators	decide	to	carve	
out	certain	issues	and	deal	with	them	separately,	reaching	an	agreement	will	be	far	
more	difficult.	There	are,	moreover,	three	issues	that	will	be	particularly	challenging	
to	resolve:	Differentiation;	Mitigation	MRV;	and	Finance	Who	Pays?	We	gave	details	
of	the	specific	stakeholders	that	will	have	particular	objections	to	the	emerging	
compromises	on	each	of	these	issues.	We	also	forecasted	that	Brazilian	and	Chinese	
representatives	will	perceive	losses	from	the	negotiation	process.	These	
stakeholders	therefore	need	to	be	offered	good	reasons,	if	necessary	in	the	form	of	
special	provisions,	to	accept	the	agreement	that	emerges.	
	
This	study	is	part	of	a	larger	research	project	involving	Professor	Bruce	Bueno	de	
Mesquita	(New	York	University),	Professor	Detlef	Prinz	(Potsdam	University)	and	
several	researchers	at	the	Oslo	Climate	Institute	Cicero.	Our	colleagues	are	applying	
a	range	of	complementary	approaches	to	forecasting	the	process	and	outcomes	of	
Paris	2015.	These	include	the	application	of	the	non-cooperative	game	theoretic	
model	by	Professor	Bueno	de	Mesquita	of	NYU.	Another	approach	involves	the	
systematic	collection	of	experts’	predictions	of	the	negotiation	outcomes.	After	the	
conference	has	been	held,	we	intend	to	return	to	our	forecasts	to	assess	their	
accuracy	and	usefulness.	
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Appendix		
	
Graphs	of	the	remaining	issues	on	which	the	Exchange	Model	forecasts	convergence.	
	
Ex	Ante	Assessments	
The	issue	of	Ex	Ante	Assessments	(EEAs)	concerns	the	provisions	to	be	included	for	
assessment	and	review	of	the	nationally	determined	contributions.	The	main	alternatives	on	
the	0-100	policy	scale	are:	
0:	Option	1:	No	EAA	
20:	Option	2:	EAA	of	aggregate	ambition	
60:	Option	3:	EAA	of	aggregate	ambition	and	technical	EAA	of	individual	INDCs	
(transparency,	clarity,	comparability,	etc.)		
90:	Option	4:	Option	3	plus	a	political	assessment	of	individual	INDCs	(ambition	and	
equity/fairness)	
100:	Option	5:	Option	4	and	a	formal	mechanism	for	involving	inputs	from	civil	society	
	
Figure	11.	Stakeholders’	Positions	on	the	Issue	of	Ex	Ante	Assessments	
Note:	Salience	scores	in	parentheses	
	
	
Figure	12.	The	Exchange	Model’s	Forecasts	on	the	Development	of	Stakeholders’	Positions	
on	the	Issue	of	Ex	Ante	Assessments	
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Adaptation	Legal	Form	
This	issue	focuses	on	the	question	of	the	extent	to	which	countries’	new	commitments	to	
adaptation	targets	should	be	country-specific	and	legally	binding.	The	alternatives	on	the	0-
100	policy	scale	are:	
0:	No	new	commitments	to	adaptation	
40:	Collective,	non-binding	provisions.	E.g.	“all	parties	are	encouraged	to	integrate	
adaptation	into	their	national	plans”	
80:	Non-binding	country-specific	commitments	
100:	Legally	binding	country-specific	commitments	
	
Figure	13.	Stakeholders’	Positions	on	the	Issue	of	Adaptation	Legal	Form	
Note:	Salience	scores	in	parentheses	
	
	
Figure	14.	The	Exchange	Model’s	Forecasts	on	the	Development	of	Stakeholders’	Positions	
on	the	Issue	of	Adaptation	Legal	Form	
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Adaptation	Institutions	
To	what	extent	should	the	institutional	framework	for	adaptation	be	strengthened?	Here,	
the	positions	on	the	0-100	policy	scale	are:	
0:	No	strengthening	
60:	Strengthen	present	institutions	(stronger	mandate,	funding	and	knowledge	platform)	
80:	Establish	new	institutions	stronger	than	present	ones.	
100:	Establish	subsidiary	body	on	adaptation	
	
Figure	15.	Stakeholders’	Positions	on	the	Issue	of	Adaptation	Institutions	
Note:	Salience	scores	in	parentheses	
	
	
Figure	16.	The	Exchange	Model’s	Forecasts	on	the	Development	of	Stakeholders’	Positions	
on	the	Issue	of	Adaptation	Institutions	
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Adaptation	Reserved	Financing	
To	what	extent	should	funds	be	reserved	for	adaptation?	
0:	No	earmarking	for	adaptation	
50:	Approximately	50%	earmarked	for	adaptation	
100:	Dedicated	levy	for	adaptation	
	
Figure	17.	Stakeholders’	Positions	on	the	Issue	of	Adaptation	Reserved	Financing	
Note:	Salience	scores	in	parentheses	
	
	
	
Figure	18.	The	Exchange	Model’s	Forecasts	on	the	Development	of	Stakeholders’	Positions	
on	the	Issue	of	Adaptation	Reserved	Financing	
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Loss	and	Damage	
To	which	degree	will	loss	&	damage	(L&D)	be	included	in	an	agreement?	
0:		 No	mention/omission	of	L&D	
10:		 Preambular	reference	only	
20:		 Reference	to	Warsaw	International	Mechanism	(WIM)	(under	adaptation)	
30:		 Separate	chapter	on	L&D	with	little	substance	
40:		 Separate	chapter	on	L&D	and	new	institutional	arrangements	with	little	substance	
50:		 Separate	chapter	on	L&D	and	new	institutional	arrangements	with	new	non-
financial	elements	(such	as	coordination	and	capacity-building)	
70:		 Separate	chapter	on	L&D	and	new	mechanism	with	new	non-financial	and	financial	
elements	(such	as	insurance)	but	no	compensation	regime	
100:		 Separate	chapter	on	L&D	and	new	non-financial	and	financial	elements,	including	a	
compensation	regime	
	
Figure	19.	Stakeholders’	Positions	on	the	Issue	of	Loss	and	Damage	
Note:	Salience	scores	in	parentheses	
	
Figure	20.	The	Exchange	Model’s	Forecasts	on	the	Development	of	Stakeholders’	Positions	
on	the	Issue	of	Loss	and	Damage	
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Finance	Amount	
What	amount	of	funds	should	be	be	mobilized	(private	and	public)	by	2030	(p.a.)?	
0:	no	new	target	(i.e.	$100b	p.a.)	
20:	Unspecified	increase	above	$100b	p.a.	
40:	$	200b	p.a.	
60:	$	300b	p.a.	
80:	$	400b	p.a.	
100:	≥$500	b	(in	excess	of	1%	of	present	OECD	GDP	p.a.)	
	
Figure	21.	Stakeholders’	Positions	on	the	Issue	of	Finance	Amount	
Note:	Salience	scores	in	parentheses	
	
	
Figure	22.	The	Exchange	Model’s	Forecasts	on	the	Development	of	Stakeholders’	Positions	
on	the	Issue	of	Finance	Amount	
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Ambition	2050	
What	mitigation	goal	should	be	set	for	2050?	
0:	No	2050	goal	
20:	Qualitative	goal	
30:	Qualitative	goal	with	a	roadmap	
50:	Goal	of	40%	GHG	reduction	relative	to	2010	
70:	Goal	of	70%	GHG	reduction	relative	to	2010	
100:	Goal	of	zero	net	emissions	
	
Figure	23.	Stakeholders’	Positions	on	the	Issue	of	Ambition	2050	
Note:	Salience	scores	in	parentheses	
	
	
Figure	24.	The	Exchange	Model’s	Forecasts	on	the	Development	of	Stakeholders’	Positions	
on	the	Issue	of	Ambition	2050	
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Ambition	2100	
What	mitigation	goal	should	be	set	for	2100?	
0:	No	2100	goal	
20:	Qualitative	goal	
30:	Qualitative	goal	with	a	roadmap	
80:	Goal	of	zero	net	emissions	
100:	Goal	of	negative	net	emissions		
	
Figure	25.	Stakeholders’	Positions	on	the	Issue	of	Ambition	2100	
Note:	Salience	scores	in	parentheses	
	
	
Figure	26.	The	Exchange	Model’s	Forecasts	on	the	Development	of	Stakeholders’	Positions	
on	the	Issue	of	Ambition	2100	
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Ambition	Progression	
What	should	be	the	mechanism	for	strengthening	commitments	over	time?	
0:	No	ambition	mechanism	
30:	No	backsliding	principle	
40:	A	non-binding	progression	principle	
65:	A	binding	progression	principle	
100:	A	binding	commitment	to	strengthen	targets	in	line	with	the	2	degrees	goal	
	
Figure	27.	Stakeholders’	Positions	on	the	Issue	of	Ambition	Progression	
Note:	Salience	scores	in	parentheses	
	
	
Figure	28.	The	Exchange	Model’s	Forecasts	on	the	Development	of	Stakeholders’	Positions	
on	the	Issue	of	Ambition	Progression	
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